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Wood, S and Raj R  
 
Abstract 
Today, airports have a rigorous security focus on operational consistency from legislative and 
policy mandates being a priority rather than allowing airport operators satisfactory autonomy 
to adapt policy to their requirements (Poole 2009). Poole and Passantino (2003) stated that 
there is a tendency to try to treat all passengers the same, which can mean resources are not 
allocated to areas of greater risk. Resources are diverted to better technology and reducing 
staffing to process large numbers of passengers. Despite technological changes there are 
concerns security at airports can often focus on ethnic minority passengers.   
 
This study critically discusses the effects of security changes since 9/11 at UK airports on 
young passengers particularly the use of full-body scanning on ethnic minorities. In the study 
(n-709) respondents aged 18-30 years old were surveyed to consider their attitudes towards 
security at airports and in particularly their opinion of profiling passengers and the use of full-
body scanning.  This study demonstrated a high degree of support for security but a significant 
difference between how white and non-white respondents perceive airport security towards 
ethnicity. 
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There has been a history of terrorist activities in the aviation sector (Sweet 2004).  Beck (2009) 
states that following 9/11 terrorism is a new world risk, which has resulted in significant 
changes to counter terrorism globally, a ‘widespread tightening of surveillance’ according to 
Lyon (2001). Since 9/11 there have been further attempts to use aircraft for terrorist purposes, 
for example in December 2001 a shoe bomber flying from Paris to Miami U.S.  In 2006 a liquid 
bomb plot in the United Kingdom (UK) was foiled which intended to bring down flights 
travelling from the UK to the U.S and in 2009 on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit a bomb 
was secreted into a passenger’s underwear. These incidents have contributed to a heightened 
level of aviation security on non-metallic objects, particularly liquids, and concealed items with 
an increased use of full-body scanners to try and detect prohibited objects.  
 
Airport security following 9/11 has impacted on ethnic travellers, particularly young male 
Muslims (Abbas 2005) going through western airports. Blackwell et al 2013 suggest they are 
treated as ‘others’ under a greater suspicion because of media portrayals of the radical and 
extremist terrorist, ‘other’ being both ethically and culturally explicit (van Swaaningen: 293 
Walklate and Mythen 2008: 215).  In 2016, the total number of passengers travelling by air in 
the European Union (EU) was 973 million, an increase of 5.9 % compared to 2015. The largest 
EU Member State for air travel is the UK with 251 million passengers in 2015. To create an 
ambiance of fear in risky identities of Muslim minority groups, in the performance of safety 
with millions of Muslims travelling peacefully in the aviation sector is more likely to be 
counter–productive than counter terrorism (Mythen et al, 2009). 
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Schneier (2003) states that security is a collection of interacting processes. Airport security is 
twofold; the first phase is the electronic screening of all luggage and passengers through 
scanners to detect metallic, non-metallic prohibited objects, CCTV and the screening of 
Passenger Names Records (PNR) against watch lists; the second phase is, according to Alards-
Tomalin et al (2014) is elevated risk screening with the potential of passengers being subject 
to questioning, detained, stripped searched, and items such as mobile phones being confiscated 
by the police. When disembarking, passengers are subject to immigration checks and possible 
police checks.  In both cases security checks, Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is the legal 




According to Kleine (2010) profiling passengers raises conflicting concerns of efficiency and 
equity. Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) stated that non-white respondents were more reluctant 
than whites to support targeting passengers.  The time cost and benefit components of targeting 
affect support for targeted screening in an efficiency-oriented manner. In peacetime, racial 
profiling collectively is illegal or unconstitutional, if not immoral (Shaun et al, 2009). Swiney 
(2006) also argues that the ineffectiveness of racial profiling weighs against its usage and 
discredits the many arguments put forth in its defence. Smith (1998) analysed that profiling 
passengers might result in perceived discrimination or racial harassment resulting in a negative 
view of policing, which can contribute to the radicalisation of individuals and entrenching 
social divides. Smith (1998) argued that profiling was a greater terror than terrorism itself. 
Since 9/11, enhanced security and profiling passengers at airports has gained more support 
(Volpp, 2002). 
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Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows designated officers the power to stop passengers 
at UK airports and question them without reasonable suspicion.  Schedule 7 is used on less 
than one percent of all UK passengers whilst security-screening technology is used on all 
passengers and luggage suggesting technology plays a greater role in the passenger experience 
of security. Hurrell (2013) has analysed the use of Schedule 7 over several years in 
experimental research and determined that it was applied more frequently to ethnic minorities. 
Choudhury and Fenwick (2011) stated that Schedule 7 impact as well as other terrorist 
legislation on the Muslim community. They found that the way in which terrorism legislation 
was being applied affected more negatively on non-white respondents.  Indeed Webster (2006) 
suggested that the Muslim community could expect more security checks. 
 
Langley (2014) reviewed the legitimacy of policing Schedule 7 by contrasting the procedural 
justice model against an experienced utility model concluding that passengers responded more 
positively to the procedural justice model that treated passengers with dignity and had created 
a sense of legitimacy.  Hasisi and Weisburd (2011) research into procedural justice in airport 
security screening in Israel identified that differences in legitimacy perceptions are by and large 
the result of the processes used in airport screening and not a direct result of ethnic identity and 
that profiling strategies aimed at preventing terrorism, which often include embarrassing public 
procedures, may jeopardise passengers’ trust in airport security. 
 
Full-body scanning, through new technology to prevent terrorism, has now become a regular 
feature in many European and US airports to prevent terrorism attacks since December 2009 
when the ‘underwear bomber’ attempted to detonate a bomb over the US as the aircraft started 
its descent. There is no clear authority to question whether a passenger should be full-body 
scanned or not, although most airports now do allow passengers an option if they refuse to be 
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scanned to have a pat-down by a security officer, which is a physical examination of a fully 
clothed passenger (minus shoes and outer clothing such as jackets). The concerns by passengers 
about the use of full-body scanning for health and safety and privacy reasons have now 
substantially addressed through new technology and regulatory requirements. Iztok (2015) 
analyse that there are human rights concerns from those wearing religious clothing, particularly 
Muslims, because they are being unduly targeted regardless of which security process applies. 
Mythen et al (2009) in their study of young British Pakistanis identified there is a real risk of 
victimisation of Muslim identities if there is a miss-management of safety in public places. 
 
Surveillance and Profiling with Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) 
 
The introduction of CCTV represents an expansion of surveillance at airports (Lyon 2003). 
The surveillance and profiling of passengers through CCTV is likely to start even before the 
passenger enters the airport terminal building, Norris et al (2014). CCTV’s primary function at 
airports is to observe suspicious behaviour, detect petty crimes and help support health and 
safety.  CCTV is not designed to scan beneath clothing or expose those being observed to health 
risks through its technology and is still subject to regulatory controls in the UK by the Data 
Protection Act (DPA) 2018 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  The DPA 2018 now 
incorporates General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
 
CCTV provided vital evidence on the terrorist attack at Glasgow International Airport in 
Scotland on June 30, 2007, where a jeep containing flammable liquid and propane canisters 
was driven at the airport building.  Since this attack, UK airports have reviewed their security 
procedures for passengers arriving at the airport prior to departure.  One key consideration is 
the proximity of passenger drop-off points to access the airport terminal building. Atlas (2003) 
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argues that is important for reinforcement of barriers and bollards around passenger access 
points to prevent any road vehicle repeating this type of attack. 
 
CCTV has played an important role in identifying terrorists, but this is often after an attack 
(Macdonald 2015). A week prior to the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005, the suspects were caught 
on CCTV at Luton Railway Station on a ‘dry’ run. The attack on a bus at Burgas airport in 
Bulgaria on July 18, 2012 showed the suspect on CCTV at the airport. The CCTV footage of 
the Burgas attacker is of importance for terrorist profiling. The suspect was, white, and dressed 
in casual western clothing. This suspect would not fit the terrorist stereotype following 9/11.  
On 18 August 2015, CCTV captured an image of the suspected Thailand bomber who killed 
20 people. 
 
Questions of identity are central to surveillance Lyon (2003). CCTV is however contentious: 
there is support by some members of the public who believe crimes can be observed and should 
be acted upon in a timely manner; others see CCTV as intrusive as well as an infringement of 
their privacy. CCTV provides one means of surveillance in and around airports, other forms of 
surveillance are, biometric passports, boarding passes, electronic screening of luggage and 
passengers, and their use of credit cards and mobile phones. Lyon (2001:19) argues that:  
 
“[m]obility creates a world of nomads and unsettled social arrangements 
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Profiling and the use of full-body scanning using Advance Imaging Technology (AIT) 
 
Full-body scanning initial purpose was to scan passengers who were suspected of drug 
smuggling by penetrating clothing and the body.  This allowed the detection of metallic and 
non-metallic objects which may have been swallowed or inserted into body cavities. This 
process is often used in the detection of drug smugglers who have concealed drugs by 
swallowing condoms filled with cocaine.  This form of policing passengers has little to do with 
the security of an airport or an airline but revels how function -creep can extend to airports and 
allow security staff to perform multi-purposes law enforcement roles. 
 
The acceleration in the introduction of full-body scanners in several airports throughout the 
world was due to the lone terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, boarding Northwest Airlines 
flight 253 in Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25, 2009. He secreted explosives in his 
underwear, probably very close to his groin, and probably non-metallic, knowing he was not 
likely be “patted” down when he would pass through the metal detector. He became known as 
the ‘underwear bomber’. As a result of the attack, in 2010 the US Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), a department of Homeland Security dedicated to all forms of transport 
threats, announced that the procedure for air passenger ‘pat-down’ was to be more thorough. 
A similar attack in December 2001 had warranted change to security processes when Richard 
Reid, the ‘Shoe Bomber’, attempted to detonate an explosive that he had hidden in his shoe.  
This attempt resulted in many international airports requiring shoes be removed and scanned.  
 
Former USA President Obama’s ordered that all new technologies should be reviewed to 
prevent any future attempts.  He also ordered the former chief advisor for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism, John Brennan, to review the terrorist watch listing process, as the 
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underwear bomber was not on the watch list although the US intelligence community knew of 
him. This exposed the complexity of the task in securing the information together. It was not 
just about gathering data, but also about making effective use of it. In this case, Umar’s father 
had met with US embassy officers in Abuja, Nigeria to warn them that he feared his son was 
becoming radicalised.  Co-ordination of information in a timely manner is paramount to react 
effectively to terrorists’ threats in real time as several US government reports have concluded 
following the attempted attack on the US with flight 253. 
 
This incident resulted in various countries around the world, who viewed themselves as 
potential targets of terrorism implementing technology that would combat this threat. The US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) presented a paper to the Committee on Homeland 
Security, US House of Representatives, on 27 January 2010, outlining better use of terrorist 
watch list information and improvements in deployment of passenger screening technologies. 
The GAO reported in 2009 that since the TSA has been established following 9/11, the TSA 
has worked on no less than ten different passenger screening technologies. The TSA, by 2010, 
had installed around 200 Advanced Imaging Technologies (AIT) machines of its intended 
target of 878 by the end of 2014.   In August 2012, the TSA had deployed around 700 units at 
more than 180 of the roughly 450 commercial passenger airports.  Following the underwear 
bomber attempt, the US might have focused more on ensuring flights from international 
airports to the US had AIT installed. AIT was not mandated, but fights bound for the US 
following the underwear bomber did have higher security requirements such as advanced 
passenger lists and additional screening (Hatton and Buchanan, 2006). 
 
The initial response to body scanning was one of alarm for the public, in both the US and UK. 
In the UK, the Prime Minister ordered an immediate review in airport security to consider the 
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use of greater profiling and an introduction of body scanning within weeks rather than months. 
Rumours circulated that the imaging would enable security personnel to view ‘naked’ 
passengers. The thought that other adults would view children raised further concerns about 
child protection under the Protection of Children’s Act 1978, s.1(1)(a).  Questions about 
privacy, illegality, and whether pictures might legally constitute ‘indecency’ were all raised as 
issues.  There was also concern about personal health and safety, as individuals would be 
exposed to radiation after being microwaved or ‘nuked’ going through a body scanner. 
 
 Passengers in UK who refused to go through body scanners on health and religious grounds 
were prevented from flying. The same rule was applied in the US concerning the issue of 
consent. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeal in United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 
Daniel Kuualoha AUKAI (2007), the Court stated;  
 
“requiring that a potential passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an on-going airport 
security search makes little sense in the post 9/11 world. Such a rule would afford terrorists 
multiple opportunities to attempt to penetrate airport security by ‘electing not to fly’ on the 
cusp of detection until a vulnerable portal is found”. B III para 5.  
 
Airports with body-scanning equipment operate different policies for passengers to pass 
through scanners and some international airports offered an alternative means of search, for 
example, the previous methods of metal scanning and patting down.  The Department of 
Transport in November 2013 provided a new code of practice for the implementation of body 
scanning those UK airports must provide alternative methods of search where passengers 
object to a full-body scan. 
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The benefit of full body scanning is that as passengers can avoid going through metal detectors 
and be patted down by security staff, the scanning is non-invasive. Passenger reaction to 
security changes can be mixed, for some passengers it has little impact for their journey. Where 
you find a mass of isolated individuals such as on a motorway, in supermarkets or at airports, 
there are no personal ties made. Carlin (2003) discusses the psychological behaviour of 
passengers that moves to a standard non-contractual relationship of norms in a matrix, 
occasionally disturbed by some individuals moving hastily due to their failing to observe advice 
on allowing enough time for the journey. The passenger experience of airport security is 
normally supportive of additional measures. If commuters are communicated with effectively 
before a journey about traffic flows and security checks, then the commuters’ expectations are 
settled and their dissatisfaction reduced (Carlin, 2003). 
 
EU Regulations of Technology at International Airports 
 
The introduction of body-scanners in the UK raises questions of privacy and health as well as 
wider considerations of treaty obligations to EU citizens and their fundamental rights to 
freedom of movement. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) (ECFR) sets out 
a number of measures that European passengers travelling within the EU might rely on in 
relation to body-scanners: Article 1, human dignity; Article 7, respect for private and family 
life; Article 8, protection of personal data.  Additionally, Article 35, Health Care, states that a 
high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of 
all Union policies and activities. Further, as to personal rights guaranteed by the charter, all 
members of the EU are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights 1951 
(ECHR), consequently the rights contained in the ECFR charter are, in many ways, replicated 
in the ECHR (Mironenko, 2011). 
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The EU is not only concerned with targeted security processes such as full-body scanning 
passengers.  It has had to deal with policies introduced by the US following 9/11, which have 
impacted on all air passengers travelling from the EU to the US. The US adopted a 
comprehensive approach to air passengers by requiring airlines to transfer data relating to both 
the crew and passengers to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to flying 
to the US, Passenger Name Records (PNR). PNR included additional passenger information 
such as payment information, e-mail addresses, frequent flying information, meal preferences, 
and whether passengers needed special assistance.  Failure to comply with these rules could 
lead to fines for airlines of $6000 per passenger, denied landing and the potential loss of future 
landing rights. The decision in C-318/04 ‘European Parliament v Council and Commission’ 
(2007, 57-70) stated that the Council decision relating to the US requirements of PNR were 
annulled because the data was outside the scope of Art 95 EC of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) and the directive is specifically related to commercial matters.  
 
In 2016, the European Union’s Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data Directive 2016/681 was 
introduced. The PNR directive appears to have been initially influenced because of US pressure 
rather than an EU initiative but was later seen necessary in order to protect aviation from Isis, 
following the Paris attacks in 2015.  There are questions on whether the safeguards within the 
Directive can prevent aviation terrorism, but more importantly protect passenger privacy. Since 
the introduction of GDPR, the directive will have received additional support by requiring the 
aviation sector in the EU to follow 'data protection principles'. They must make sure passenger 
information is used fairly, lawfully and transparently. 
 
PNR is likely to remain a contentious matter with the development of technology and 
advancement of information that can be contained on a biometric passport.  The matter of 
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personal sensitive information and data protection can be compromised under the guise of 
counter-terrorism. PNR does run a real risk of function-creep, as Schneier (2010) states: 
 
 “Far too often we build security for one purpose, only to find it being used for another purpose 
-- one it wasn't suited for in the first place”.  p.88 
 
Schneier’s (2010) hypothesis can be tested against the circumstances surrounding the 
underwear bomber.  The underwear bomber should have been, but was not on the US watch 
list, rendering the PNR process flawed and requiring the watch list process to re-evaluated. 
Further, the incident set in train a multimillion-dollar global investment developing new full-
body scanning technology at airports to detect secreted non-metallic objects.  The first 
prototypes proved to be questionable both on health and safety grounds, as well as privacy.  
Schneier (2009) states, ‘when people are fearful, they need to see tangible and visible security 
changes’, such as full-body scanner machines, to make them feel safe.  Full-body scanners may 
be expensive, but their introduction to airports is reactive. Schneier (2009) describes such 
responses as ‘security theatre for the present’ not future aviation threats. 
 
Aviation terrorist strategies have indeed changed since the underwear bomber, which show 
how limited expensive responses such as full-body scanning machines can be.  Airport 
employees, known as ‘insiders’ who sympathise with terrorist groups, such as Isis, have 
supported attacks by placing bombs on aircraft, for example in 2015 the Russian Metro-jet 
Flight 9268 exploded over Egypt killing all 224 passengers and crew. 
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The Costs of Full-Body Scanning for Airports  
 
The EU failed to make a final decision and confirm that X-ray backscatter scanners are safe, 
despite early reports and research suggesting they were. The EU Commission did allow the 
continuing use of body scanning but under strict operational and technical conditions, but the 
trialling of X-ray backscatters was to cease.  The effect of such an announcement was to suggest 
they would not be taking any chances to health if there were other options such as the millimetre 
technology on offer. In response to the EU Commissions decision to adopt a new legal 
framework on security scanners in a press release (2011), Kallas Vice-President, Commissioner 
for transport stated: 
 
“Security scanners are not a panacea but they do offer a real possibility to reinforce passenger 
security. Security scanners are a valuable alternative to existing screening methods and are a 
very efficient in detecting both metallic and non-metallic objects. It is still for each Member 
State or airport to decide whether to deploy security scanners”.   
 
In the UK, Manchester international airport had been running backscatter tests for three years 
from 2010 and was satisfied with their use. However, the EU’s failure to give confirmation on 
their safety, coupled with the press release in 2011, which effectively ruled out any further 
testing for X-ray backscattering machines, resulted in their removal. This cost Manchester 
airport approximately £1.3 million and required them to recruit an additional 55-security staff.  
Manchester was the only airport in the EU using backscattering scanning machine at the end 
of the three-year trial. India made a similar commitment to remove the controversial X-ray 
backscatter machines from some airports and replace them with millimetre-wave machines, 
subject to intense scrutiny of the technology and price. The US government in 2013 had ordered 
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the removal of 250 similar machines in favour of millimetre-wave machines. The TSA had 
requested a scientific test from the National Research Council (NRC) in July 2015 to review, 
on the grounds of health and safety, two-millimetre machines that were in current use L3 
ProVision 1 and L3 ProVision 2. The conclusion was the machines were safe but passengers 
who may have concerns, because they had pacemakers or other medical problems to consider 
other forms of screening such as physical pat-downs.  
 
On the matter of personal images, airports gave assurances that personnel could not see the 
passenger only the electronic image and were monitoring images elsewhere in the airport. 
Whilst this process was in line with the 2011 UK Code of Practice at the time of governing the 
use of body-scanning, passengers did not get to see the picture or images produced of 
themselves, or the level of transparency and imagery of those pictures. In contrast to UK 
airports, the experience at Schiphol Amsterdam Airport was quite different. Their use of 
millimetre wave technology and ATR software no longer showed an actual body shape of the 
passenger but a generic cartoon human shape or no shape at all. This process appears far less 
intrusive because it is possible for the person scanned to see the cartoon outline.  The US has 
taken a similar line to the EU in the removal of X-ray backscatter units and the introduction of 
millimetre wave with ATR software by 2013. There will be clearly a significant cost to the 
whole sector for those who were active in the introduction of X-ray backscatter machines.  
Indeed, in 2014 Manchester Airport, as well as all other major UK airports, introduced new 
state-of-the-art non-invasive body scanning technology in response to new regulations put in 
place by the UK Department for Transport and the Security Scanners Direction 2015 and 
adapted into the Aviation Security Act 1982. 
 
15 | P a g e  
 
The growing acceptance of the use of full-body scanning can be explained by the improvement 
of the technology and the availability of more information and research on the actual impact 
on health. The absence of superfluous news headlines about full-body scanning might have 
also play a part in supporting confidence in the use of new technology and separating fact from 
fiction.  
 
The key to improving passenger satisfaction and the aviation security experience is by having 
a system that is safe, reliable, and efficient in processing large volumes of people quickly as 
possible through security. Airports generate significant income for their owners, from car 
parking, hotels, airline chargers, to the rents generated from leasehold units within the airport, 
engages airports with passenger satisfaction. The recommended check-in for long haul airlines 
increased from two hours to three hours post 9/11; today this has been mitigated through new 
technology. The ability to check in on line 24 hours before the flight allows passengers to check 
in their luggage 90 minutes before a flight.  Airports have been transformed over the last two 
decades from having basic shopping and eating opportunities to the equivalent of large 
shopping malls. In large airports, they offer a multitude of goods and services. Therefore, 
airport owners have an interest in making airport security an efficient, dignified and a quick 
transitional experience when passengers are departing to ensure they have time to spend monies 
on goods and services.  
 
The cost benefit analysis of full-body scanning raises several questions. Since the underwear 
bomber, there is no evidence of any other similar attempt or that full-body scanning would 
have prevented that attempt. The evidence suggests that terrorism has benefited those who sell 
security technology and services rather than the passenger.  The passenger has had to suffer 
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security processes, such as, additional waiting times, inconvenience of screening and 




In the framework of this study, the primary research is meant to collect data from students at 
Leeds Becket University (LBU). It was decided to undertake research utilising a quantitative 
approach, the rationale for using this data sample is twofold; the first was the accessibility to 
respondents on campus, the second was the attention counter security services, the media have 
focused on British Universities, and the age profile of those engaged in terrorist activities. 
Many students and recent graduates have taken part in several terrorist attacks or convicted on 
related charges.  In the recent Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the Government has 
now placed a duty on Universities to be proactive in counter terrorism. 
 
The data was collected over a four period between 2011 -2015 from 711 respondents.    
Manchester and Leeds Bradford airport accounted for 64% of security experiences from the 
711 respondents which suggest a degree of regionalisation in the findings. There is no evidence 
to suggest that there are any significant security differences at major airports in the UK in 
treating passengers differently.  Therefore, this data sample can be generalised to cover UK 
passenger experience of airport security.  93% of respondents were aged 18-25, which gave an 
insight into the experiences of airport security from young passengers. 
 
Over the four-year period 62% of the respondent were female. This is comparable with the 
LBU university population data in which the male average over this period was 38%. It is also 
comparable with the gender population of UK Universities.  It has been suggested that there is 
17 | P a g e  
 
no gender imbalance for the support of extremist views, which is supported by the significant 
number of women that have travelled to Syria to support Isis.  Nevertheless, it is acknowledged 
that men have carried out the majority of terrorist attacks in the West since 9/11.  
  
The data was analysed using two methods, the first was a Chi-Square test and the second was 
cross-tabulation.  In the first method of analysis, the data set in Table 1 was recoded from the 
large list of ethnic backgrounds and divided into two categories white and non-white to enable 
a Pearson Chi-Square 𝑥2 (Nonparametric test). Table 1 shows that the first three ethnic groups 
consist of White British, White Irish and other White, which cumulatively the White grouping 
accounts for 61.9% of all respondents. The other 39.1% consisted of thirteen groups and were 
placed together and coded as non-white. (see Table 1).  
 
The second method of analysis used cross-tabulation to enable more variables to be assessed, 
such as gender, and recode ethnicity more broadly into white, South Asian, black and other. 
The largest non-white ethnicity group was South Asian which consisted of two groups Asian 
or Asian British Pakistani and accounted for 17% of respondents.  No religious data was 
gathered but an assumption can be made that the South Asian category would contain a large 
Muslim population. This data would consider whether certain ethnic groups other than White 
British, Irish or other White passengers are more prone to, or perceive themselves to be more 
prone to, be subjected to extra security checks. Respondents were able to reflect on several 
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Table 1 Ethnicity  
 
Gender 
Total Female Male 
 White British 291 125 416 
White Irish 1 1 2 
Other white 11 10 21 
Asian or Asian British Indian 8 11 19 
Asian or Asian British Pakistani 72 54 126 
Asian or Asian British 
Bangladeshi 
3 8 11 
Chinese 1 0 1 
Other Asian 5 13 18 
Black or Black British Caribbean 4 6 10 
Black or Black British African 21 23 44 
Other Black 2 4 6 
Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean 
10 2 12 
Mixed White and Black African 2 3 5 
Mixed White and Asian 3 2 5 
Other mixed 6 0 6 
Other ethnicity 2 3 5 
Total 442 265 707 
 
Government literature and the 2009 and 2014 Codes of Practice relating to the implementation 
of Schedule 7 clearly state that no one should be stopped and searched solely on the grounds 
of ethnicity. Anderson (2015), the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism legislation (2011-2017), 
stated in his report that the statistics so far concerning Schedule 7 did not indicate Schedule 7 
was being exercised in a discriminatory way. This study does not ask its respondents directly 
whether they have experienced a Schedule 7 screening. It asks respondents several questions 
on whether profiling is a positive security measure and whether it should discriminate against 
certain passengers.  
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Findings and Discussions 
In this study, 96% of respondents agree with the current level of security checks at airports and 
98% suggested they did not discriminate against them. Border Control officers had stopped 
44% of respondents which appears an unduly high number, however respondents could reflect 
on more than one flight leaving or returning to the UK which resulted in recording 3867 flight 
experiences, and this means an average of 18% of the respondents were stopped.  Female 
respondents suggested that when stopped they were 7% more likely to be treated professionally 
than male respondents. Those respondents who claimed they had experienced unprofessional 
behaviour, when stopped by officers, suggested it was either the officer’s attitude or being 
picked out, whilst other passengers had not, as their reason. There was no suggestion by the 
respondents that any detainment was related to suspicion of terrorist activity. 
 
18% females and 36% males disagree that profiling is good to target passengers acting 
suspiciously and 21% male and 11% female agree that profiling is an opportunity to harass 
ethnic minorities.  The majority of ethnic minorities disagree. 84% females and 80% males 
disagree with the statement that profiling allows and unrestricted right for security to harass 
any traveller. However, 16% females and 20% males agree with the statement of which a 
greater proportion are British whites than ethnic minorities.   
 
Technology and Security 
In relation technology as a means of airport security. Table 2 shows 76% respondents agreed 
with being searched when the metal detector detected metal.  A further 15% remained neutral. 
4% of those who suggested they should not go through a metal detector or be searched, did so 
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because they said they did not look like a terrorist were Asian or Black respondents, against 
1% White.  This might suggest that White passengers are more willing to adhere to security 
processes or that some ethnic minorities perceive security to be driven by ethnic profiling. The 
differences in gender resistance to metal detectors showed male respondents approximately 
twice as likely as females to disapprove. Overall there is a strong acceptance for the use of 
metal detectors, but some resistance to the process, when the respondent perceives that they do 
not look or dress in a way that could practically secrete weapons.  Every passenger goes through 
a metal detector, so its perhaps unreasonable to suggest there could be any form of human 
profiling on the grounds of ethnicity in this particular security process. 
 




Total White Asian Other Black 
 I fully accept being searched when the 
detector goes off 
345 102 22 49 518 
I do not like being searched because I do not 
look like a terrorist 
5 16 0 6 27 
I do not like being searched because I am with 
family and I am obviously not a threat 
13 12 3 1 29 
I do not like being searched because my 
clothing would not secrete anything 
dangerous 
9 10 1 5 25 
I neither like nor dislike being searched 67 22 4 16 109 
Total 439 162 30 77 708 
 
Table 3 shows that 77% of respondents are in approval of full-body scanning, which is very 
similar to the approval of metal detectors. 17% of Asian respondents raised greater concerns 
than 8% White, suggesting that full-body scanning is an intrusion on their personal lives. 9% 
of Asian respondents raised greater concerns than 2% White, that full-body scanning might be 
a risk to their health. Only one person, from the Asian ethnicity group agreed that passengers 
wearing religious clothing should be subject to full-body scanning.  The gender resistance to 
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the use of full-body scanning is similar to metal detectors with male respondents twice as likely 
to disapprove than females. 
 
Table 3 Body Scanners 
 
 White Asian Other Black Total 
 I welcome additional security like body 
scanners 
381 97 17 48 543 
I think body scanning is an intrusion on 
personal life 
33 27 6 14 80 
I am concerned about the possible 
health risks of being scanned 
10 15 4 6 35 
Body scanning is unnecessary and 
causes delays 
16 22 3 9 50 
Only foreign nationals and British 
nationals wearing religious clothing 
should be scanned 
0 1 0 0 1 





A series of questions were asked to respondents to in order to determine the hypothesis 
‘Airports security applies risk assessment equally to all passengers in UK airports’ (𝐻0null).  
18% females and 36% males disagree that profiling is good to target passengers acting 
suspiciously and 21% male and 11% female agree that profiling is an opportunity to harass 
ethnic minorities. The majority of ethnic minorities disagree. 84% females and 80% males 
disagree with the statement that profiling allows and unrestricted right for security to harass 
any traveller. However, 16% females and 20% males agree with the statement of which a 
greater proportion are British whites than ethnic minorities.   
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Although most respondents in Table 4 (605 or 85%) disagree that profiling gives an opportunity 
to harass ethnic minorities, differences in proportions of White and Non-White who disagree 
are observed.   A Chi-square test was carried out to see if these differences were significant.   
The expected count in all cells was five or more so the test is valid.  According to the test (𝑃 =
 .000) which is less than the specified .05 (𝑎 = .05).  Therefore, from this example the 𝐻0 
would be rejected and consequently risk assessment does not apply equally to all passengers in 
the opinion of these respondents. Gender was not included in the Chi-square test, however from 
the previous descriptive data it appears that males are more likely to be opposed and suspicious 
of security process than females.  
 
Table 4 Case Processing Summary 
 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
White and Non-white 
categories * Profiling 
gives an opportunity 
for security to harass 
ethnic minorities 
709 99.7% 2 0.3% 711 100.0% 
 Profiling gives an 
opportunity for 




White and Non-white 
categories 
White 410 30 440 
Non-
white 
195 74 269 
Total 605 104 709 
 
Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree that airport security legitimises 
discrimination against ethnic minorities. The majority set out in Table 5 disagree (676 or 95%).   
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A Chi-square test was again carried out to see if these differences were significant between 
White and Non-White.  According to the test (𝑃 =  .002) which is less than the specified .05 
(𝑎 = .05).  Therefore, from this example the 𝐻0 would be rejected and risk assessment does 
not apply equally to all passengers in the opinion of these respondents.  Whilst it can be 
suggested there are concerns from some ethnic minorities, the majority of passengers (96%) 
agree with the current level of security checks and that 98% agreed security did not discriminate 
against them. 
 
Table 5 Case Processing Summary 
 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 






709 99.7% 2 0.3% 711 100.0% 
 Profiling gives an 
opportunity for 




White and Non-white 
categories 









Total    
 
The key to improving passenger satisfaction and the aviation security experience is by having 
a system that is safe, reliable, and efficient in processing large volumes of people quickly as 
possible through security. Airports generate significant income for their owners, from car 
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parking, hotels, airline chargers, to the rents generated from leasehold units within the airport, 
engages airports with passenger satisfaction. The recommended check in for long haul airlines 
increased from two hours to three hours post 9/11; today this has been mitigated through new 
technology.  The ability to check in on line 24 hours before the flight allows passengers to 
check in their luggage 90 minutes before a flight.  Airports have been transformed over the last 
two decades from having basic shopping and eating opportunities to the equivalent of large 
shopping malls.  In large airports, they offer a multitude of goods and services. Therefore, 
airport owners have an interest in making airport security an efficient, dignified and a quick 
transitional experience when passengers are departing to ensure they have time to spend monies 




As the study revealed, the impact of the higher levels of security, both full-body scanning and 
metal detectors, show how technology has increased at airports to support security processes.  
All passengers go through metal detectors, whilst currently only certain passengers in the UK 
go through full-body scanning. The prerequisite is often, but not mandatory, an individual who 
has triggered the metal detector. There appears to be a higher perception, from the Chi-Square 
test, that non-white respondents are selected for full-body scanning because of their ethnicity 
rather than the metal detector being triggered. The use of full- body scanning has reduced in 
the UK since 2015. Therefore, the data outcomes might be different if another survey was 
carried out today. Full-body scanning is still widely used throughout the US. Developing 
countries who did not respond to the underwear bomber with technology, such as full-body 
scanning machines, are currently introducing them or updating previous systems.  India has 
directed 84 airports to introduce full-body scanning technology for March 2020. 
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Throughout 2014, the UK moved its security focus away from full-body scanning a significant 
number of passengers traveling outside the UK and UK airports have reduced body-scanning 
machinery.  Passengers, who now trigger metal detectors, are to be subject to tougher pat-
downs as well as shoe removal and scanning if metal is detected. These pat-downs could be 
described as both thorough and intrusive, but at the same time more effective than the previous 
pat-down system that operated in the UK and that still operates outside the UK. The use of full-
body scanning is clearly now used as a final scan or deterrent when all other processes are 
deemed not appropriate. This might be when a passenger for religious reasons does not want 
to be touched.  It is unclear what practice now triggers a full-body scan, but one explanation 
appears to be when passengers have removed items and are still triggering the metal detector. 
In late 2013, the UK Department of Transport issued a new Code of Practice for full-body 
scanning. Airports must now provide alternative means of search other than full-body scanning. 
This move is to pacify passengers concerned with images and health rather than prevent 
terrorist attacks because anyone asking for an alternative means of search are likely to attract a 
thorough pat-down.    
 
Full-body scanning was always going to be challenging because it is almost impossible to scan 
every passenger and be commercially viable and competitive at the same time.  It could be 
reasonably suggested that following the underwear bomber’s attempt in 2009, security at 
international airports simply needed to intensify pat downs rather than rush to spend more than 
a billion dollars collectively on machinery and technology.  Full-body scanning is still 
important and rational; whether a passenger will be scanned is today decided by the policy of 
the airport or simply that the passenger has triggered a metal detector alarm.  Although, full-
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body scanning has been reduced at UK airports it is likely to be a permanent, albeit specific 
feature, in the future.   
  
27 | P a g e  
 
Bibliography    
Journals  
 
Abbas, T. (2005b) Muslims Britain: Communities Under Pressure, London: Zed Books 
Alards-Tomalin, D. Tamara L. Ansons. Tara C. Reich. Yumiko Sakamoto. Rita Davie. Jason 
P.Leboe-McGowana. Launa C. Leboe-McGowana (2014) Airport security measures and their 
influence on enplanement intentions: Responses from leisure travellers attending a Canadian 
University. Journal of Air Transport Management Volume 37, p 60-68 
Atlas, R, ‘Designing Against Terror’, [2003] Violence and Crime. American Society of 
Safety Engineers January. 
Beck, U. (2009) ‘World at Risk’, (Polity Press) 
Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. D. (2013a).’ I know who I am, but who do they 
think I am? Muslim perspectives on encounters with airport authorities. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 36(6), 61090-1108. doi:10.1080/01419870.2011.645845 
Carlin, A. (2003) ‘Observation and membership categorization: Recognising ‘normal 
appearances’ in public space’ Journal of Mundane Behaviour 4(1): 475–99. 
Choudhury T, and Fenwick, H. (2011) ‘The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim 
communities’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission Research 2011 report) 72 
Elias. B (2012) Report for Congress “Airport Body Scanners: The Role of Advanced Imaging 
Technology in Airline Passenger Screening”, September 20, 
Hatton C and Buchanan, C [2006] ‘Passenger data caught in holding pattern’, ‘European 
lawyer 63, 13 
28 | P a g e  
 
Hasisi B, and Weisburd, D. (2011) ‘Going beyond Ascribed Identities: The Importance of 
Procedural Justice in Airport Security Screening in Israel’ Law and Society Review Vol 45 
Iss 4, 867-892. 
Hayes, B (2006) ‘Arming Big Brother’ The EU’s Security Research Programme ISSN 187-
3408 2006 1-4 
 
Hurrell , K  (2013) ‘An Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under 
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000’, Equality and Human Rights Commission, Briefing 
paper No 8 Manchester 10-29 
Kleine Y, S. (2010) ‘Racial Profiling in the Name of National Security: Protecting Minority 
Travellers' Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism’ Boston College Third World Law Journal 
Volume 30 | Issue 1 Article 5 
Kornblatt, S (2007) ‘Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger Screening Reasonable 
Under the Fourth Amendment?’ (Loyola, L.A. Law Review, Fall) 403. 
Iztok, P (2015) ‘Relationship between Security and Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism: A 
Case of Introducing Body Scanners in Civil Aviation’ International Studies: Interdisciplinary 
Political and Cultural Journal, vol 17, Iss 1, 145-158 
Langley ‘B. (2014) A randomised control trial comparing the effects of procedural justice to 
experienced utility theories in airport security January 2014  
<http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/Langley,%20B.%20A%20randomised%20control
%20trial%20comparing%20the%20effects%20of%20procedural%20justice%20to%20experi
enced%20utility%20theories%20in%20airport%20security%20stops.pdf> accessed 1 August 
2017 
Lowe, D. (2016) ‘The European Union’s Passenger Name Record Data Directive 2016/681: 
Is It Fit for Purpose? International Criminal Law Review, vol 16 iss 5 
29 | P a g e  
 
Lyon, D (2003) edt ‘Surveillance as Social Sorting’ Routledge London & New York 
Lyon, D. (2001) Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press 
Lyon, D. (2001) ‘Surveillance after September 11’ Sociological Research online’, vol. 6 no. 
3, http://www.socresonline.org.uk/6/3/lyon.html accessed 30 August 2019. 
Mendez M. (2007) Case comment C-317/04 and C-318/04 ‘European Parliament v Council 
and Commission’ European Constitutional Law Review  
Mironenko. O [2011] ‘Body scanners versus privacy and data protection’ Computer Law and 
Security review (2011) 27(3) .232–244. 
Moore, Kerry, Mason, Paul and Lewis, Justin Matthew Wren (2008) Images of Islam in the 
UK: the representation of British Muslims in the national print news media 2000-2008 
(working paper) Cardiff 
Mythen, G, Walklate, S and Khan, F (2009) ‘I’m a Muslim, but I’m not a Terrorist’: 
Victimization, Risky Identities and Performance of Safety The British Journal of Criminology 
Vol 49 Iss 6 pp736-754  
Mythen G  Walklate, S Criminology and Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or 
Governmentality? The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 46, Issue 3, 1 May 2006, 
Pages 379–398, 
Norris, C, McCahill, M and Wood D (2014) ‘The Growth of CCTV: a global perspective on 
the international diffusion of video surveillance in publicly accessible space’ Surveillance & 
Society, Surveillance Studies Network, 
<http://queens.scholarsportal.info/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3369> 
accessed 12 July 2017 
30 | P a g e  
 
Özcan, M and Yilmaz, F (2007). ‘Pendulum Swings in between Civil Rights and Security: EU 
Policies against Terrorism in the Light of the PNR’ Case Uluslararas Hukuk ve Politika Cilt 
3, ss 99-118. 
Pozzo F, R D (2015) ‘EU Legal Framework for Safeguarding Air Passenger Rights’ Springer 
Publishing 2015 
Schneier, B. (2010) ‘Security and Function Creep’ IEEE Security & Privacy 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2010/01/security_and_functio.html accessed 29 
August 2019 
Schneier, B. (2009) ‘Beyond Security Theatre’ New Internationalist 
November  pp 10-13 
Schneier, B. (2003) ‘Beyond Fear’ (Copernicus, New York) ISBN 0-387-02620-7 
Schneier, B. (2012) ‘Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust That Society Needs to Thrive’ 
(John Wiley and Sons Inc, Indianapolis’) p136  
Schneier, B (2010) IEEE Security & Privacy (Volume: 8 , Issue: 1 , Jan.-Feb) DOI: 
10.1109/MSP.2010.47  
Shaun L. Gabbidon, Everette B. Penn, Kareem L. Jordan and George E. Higgins (2009) 
Racial Profiling at Airports The Influence of Race/Ethnicity on the Perceived Prevalence and 
Support  Sage https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403408327384. Accessed 12 May 2018 
Sweet, K (2004) ‘Aviation and Airport security’ (Pearson Education) 7 
Swiney.  C, F (2006) ‘Racial Profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the US: Historical, 
Empirical, and Legal Analysis Applied to the War on Terrorism’. Muslim World Journal of 
Human Rights vol 3, Issue 1, Article 3 
31 | P a g e  
 
Smith, D (1998). ‘Passenger Profiling: A greater terror than terrorism itself’ The John 
Marshall Law Review [1998] 167-169 
Van Swaaningen R. ‘Public Safety and the Management of Fear’, Theoretical Criminology, 
2005 vol 9 289-305 
Viscusi K, W. and Zeckhauser, R, J (2003) ‘Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism 
Risk’ The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol 26, (Kluwer Academic Publishers) 99, 120 
Volpp, L. (2002)  ‘The Citizen and the terrorist’ 23, Immigr & Nat’lity, L, Rev 561 [2002] 
(Berkeley Law) http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/515. Accessed 12 May 2018 
Webster, B (2006) ‘Muslims face extra checks in new travel crackdown’ The Times (London 




Europa press release, Aviation Security: Commission adopts new rules on the use of security 
scanners at European airports, November 14, 2011. 
Kallas S Vice-President, Commissioner for transport Europa press release, Aviation Security: 
Commission adopts new rules on the use of security scanners at European airports, November 
14, 2011 
Schneier, B. (2018) ‘Don’t fear the TSA cutting airport security. Be glad that they’re talking 
about it.’ Washington Post 7th August 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/08/07/dont-fear-the-tsa-
32 | P a g e  
 
cutting-airport-security-be-glad-that-theyre-talking-about-it/?noredirect=on Accessed 28 
August 2019 
Stelin,. S ‘Trying Passenger patience’ New York Times April 2013 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/business/public-pours-scorn-on-airport-body-
scanners.html> accessed 10 December 2017. 
Townsend, M. Revill, J and Townsend, P, K ‘Terror threat 'critical' as Glasgow attacked’ The 
Guardian Newspaper 1 July 2007 
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jul/01/terrorism.world2> accessed 15 June 2018 




 BBC News ‘7 July bombers spotted on CCTV after exhaustive hunt’, 13th October 2010, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11534951> (accessed 10 October 2017). 
BBC News Manchester Airport group reported profits of £96.5 million in 2008. 
<http://news.bbc.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/manchester/7530689.stm>, accessed (12 
December 2016).  
Bob Burns, The TSA Blog ‘Rapiscan Backscatter Contract Terminated’—Units to be 
removed’ 2013  <http://blog.tsa.gov/2013/01/rapiscan-backscatter-contract.html> accessed 
May 2013. See also The FAA Modernisation and Reform Act 2012 that all TSA body 
scanners should be equipped with ATR by June 1, 2012 extended to June 1, 2013. 
33 | P a g e  
 
Chen, H, Emma Harrison, Helier Cheung, Josephine McDermott, Saira Asher & Anna Jones 
‘Bangkok bombing aftermath’ <BBC News http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-asia-
33970237 > (accessed 18 August 2017) 
European Commission ‘Aviation security: Commission adopts new rules on the use of 
security scanners at European airports’ November 2011 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-1343_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 21 December 2016) 
Gov. UK  Population of England and Wales https://www.ethnicity-facts-
figures.service.gov.uk/british-population/national-and-regional-populations/population-of-
england-and-wales/latest (accessed 21 December 2018) 
Huffington Post ‘John Tyner refusing to go through San Diego Airport’, November 13, 2010. 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/15/john-tyner-videos_n_783678.html> (accessed 
17 July 2018) 
Kravets D ‘TSA Wants to Know if Airport Scanners are Nuking You’, Privacy Crime and 
Security Online  <http://www.wired.com/2012/12/airport-scanners-nuking-you/> (accessed 
12 April 2017) 
Roxby P. ‘Are airport body scanners a radiation risk?’ BBC news, July 1 2011 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-13990434> (accessed 10 January 2018) 
Parliamentary office of Science and Technology, ‘CCTV’ Postnote 2002 April No. 175. In 
1998 £170 million government spending announcement for CCTV in the UK. 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/POST-PN-175> 
(accessed 10 June 2017) 
34 | P a g e  
 
Romero F. ‘Is the TSA Targeting Attractive Women?’  
<http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/02/16/is-the-tsa-targeting-attractive-women/> (accessed 03 
March 2018). 
Schiphol, Amsterdam Airport Information leaflet. Airport security, “Security Scan”, 
Schiphol, <http://www.schiphol.nl/B2B/Advertising/MediaProducts/ProductSheets.htm> 
(accessed 10 December 2016) 
Statewatch <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/oct/03edps-body-scanners.htm> (accessed 
21st January 2018) 
The Royal Academy of Engineering ‘Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance Challenges of 
Technological Change’ March 2007 
<http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/dilemmas-of-privacy-and-surveillance-report> 
(accessed 12 May 2018) 
TSA Blog ‘TSA Officers Focus on Security, Not Good Looks’ February 15, 2012, <http:// 
blog.tsa.gov/2012/02/tsa-offcers-focus-on-security-not-good.html.> (accessed 12 April 2018)   
  TSA, More Information: Advanced Imaging Technology 
<http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/reading.shtm>. (accessed 12 June 2017) 
Wagenaar P and Boersma, K ‘Zooming in on ‘heterotopia’: CCTV-operator practices at 




30 May 2017) 
 




Aviation Policy Framework presented by the Secretary of State for Transport, (Crown Press, 
London March 2013): 7. 
Agence Françoise de Sécurité Sanitaire de I Environnement et du Travail relative au “scanner 
corporel a ondes “millimétriques” Pro Vision 100” February 15, 2010. 
Butcher, L ‘Aviation Security’ Department Business and Transport 12-14 
<file:///C:/users/wood02/Downloads/SN01246%20 (9).pdf> (accessed 10 June 2017). 
CAA statistical data 
https://www.caa.co.uk/uploadedFiles/CAA/Content/Standard_Content/Data_and_analysis/Da
tasets/Airport_stats/Airport_data_2015/Table_01_Size_of_UK_Airports_2015_Comp_2010.
pdf (accessed 21 January 2016). 
Civil Aviation Authority ‘Passenger’ Experiences of Air Travel’ Eighth Report of Session 
2006-07 vol 1. June 21st 2012    <http://www.dft.gov.uk/statistics/releases/air-passenger-
experience-of-security-screening-results-caa-survey-module-2011> (accessed 27 June 2017). 
Code of Practice for the Acceptable use of Security Scanners in an Aviation Security 
Environment, November 2011. 
 
David Anderson Report on the Operation in 2014 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006, September 2015,  
<https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Independent-Review-of-Terrorism-Report-2014-print2.pdf> 
(accessed 12 October 2017, 28). 
Department of Transport Code of Practice for the Acceptable use of Security Scanners in an 
Aviation Security Environment July 2015 (see updated October 2016 Code) 
36 | P a g e  
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397618/Securi
ty_Scanner_Code_of_Practice.pdf accessed 12 January 2016 See European Parliament Draft 
Opinion on aviation security with a special focus on security scanners (2010/2154(INI). 
Draft Report Committee on Transport and Tourism European Parliament, February 23, 2011. 
Department of Transport UK Aviation Forecasts January 2013, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223839/aviat
ion-forecasts.pdf> (accessed 01 May 2018:5-7). 
Department of Transport ‘Equality Impact Assessment on the use of security scanners at UK 
airports’. November 2013. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/344642/1312
23_Equality_Impact_Assessment_on_the_use_of_security_scanners_at_UK_airports_Final.p
df> (accessed 10 May 2017). 
House Hearing Committee on Homeland security <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg73356/html/CHRG-112hhrg73356.htm> (accessed 12 May 2017).   
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Counter–terrorism Measures in British 
Airports Ninth Report Session March 2010 
<http://www.ukaccs.info/homeaffairsctteesecurityreport0310.pdf> (accessed 15 December 
2017). 
Liberty’s response to the Department of Transport’s consultation on the Code of Practice for 
the acceptable use of advanced imaging technology (body scanners) in an aviation security 
environment July 2010 p4 <https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/liberty-s-response-to-the-body-scanners-consultation-july-
2010.pdf> (accessed 09 November 2017). 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002 (OJ L 355, 
December 12, 2002. 
37 | P a g e  
 
 
Schedule 7 Code of Practice <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/schedule-7-
code-of-practice> (accessed 12 July 2017). 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence “Summary report on the attempted Terrorist Attack 
on Northwest Airlines 253” May 18, 2010, the White House review of the attempt.  
The Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the use of security scanners 
at airports, June 15, 2010. 
Timothy Sparapani, ACLU legislative Council, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
2006. <https://www.aclu.org/statement-timothy-d-sparapani-aclu-legislative-counsel-hearing-
regarding-US-transportation-security> (accessed 12 June 2018). 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. Daniel Kuualoha AUKAI, Defendant-Appellant. No. 04-10226.     Decided: 
August 10, 2007 
 
